Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1996

Joseph D. Sanders v. The City and Municipality of
Draper, The Draper City Board of Adjustment, The
Draper City Planning Committee, The Draper City
Council, Charles L. Hoffman, Robert Brown, Kim
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Stevens
: Brief of Appellee
Part of the Law Commons
Utah Court of Appeals
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Reid W. Lambert; Nicholas E. Hales; Woodbury & Kesler, P.C.; Attorneys for Plaintiff/ Appellant
Sanders; Bruce A. Maak; of Counsel; Kimball, Parr, Waddoups, Brown & Gee; Attorney for
Defendants/ Appellees for Defendants/ Appellees Robert E. and Diane Brown.
Jody K. Burnett; Williams & Hunt; Attorneys for Draper City Defendants/ Appellees.
Jody K Burnett WILLIAMS & HUNT Attorneys for Draper City Defendants/Appellees 257 East
200 South, Suite 500 P. O. Box 45678 Salt Lake City, UT 84145-5678 Telephone: (801) 521-5678
Reid W. Lambert Nicholas E. Hales WOODBURY & KESLER, P.O. Attorneys for Plaintiff/
Appellant Sanders 265 East 100 South, #300 Salt Lake City, UT 84111 Telephone: (801) 364-1100
Bruce A. Maak, Of Counsel KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE Attorney for
Defendants/ Appellees Robert E. and Diane Brown 185 South State Street, #1300 Salt Lake City,
UT 84111 Telephone (801) 532-7840
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Joseph D. Sanders v. The City and Municipality of Draper, The Draper City Board of Adjustment, The Draper City
Planning C, No. 960833 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1996).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/585

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

TN

TUT?

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

JOSEPH D. SANDERS
BRIEF OF DRAPER CITY
APPELLEES
VS.

THE CITY AND MUNICIPALITY OF
DRAPER, THE DRAPER CITY BOARD OF
ADJUSTMENT, THE DRAPER CITY
PLANNING COMMITTEE, THE DRAPER
CITY COUNCIL, CHARLES L.
HOFFMAN, Mayor of Draper, ROBERT
BROWN, and KIM STEVENS,

Case No. 960833-CA

Defendants/Appellees.

APPEAL FROM A DECISION OF THE
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY,
JUDGES LEONARD H. RUSSON AND ANNE M. STIRBA

Oral Argument Priority Classification No. 15

Reid W. Lambert
Nicholas E. Hales
WOODBURY & KESLER, P.O.
Attorneys for Plaintiff/
Appellant Sanders
265 East 100 South, #300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 364-1100

Jody K Burnett
WILLIAMS & HUNT
Attorneys for Draper City
Defendants/Appellees
257 East 200 South, Suite 500
P. O. Box 45678
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-5678
Telephone: (801) 521-5678

Bruce A. Maak, Of Counsel
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN
& GEE
Attorney for Defendants/
Appellees Robert E. and Diane Brown
185 South State Street, #1300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone (801) 532-7840

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
JOSEPH D. SANDERS
BRIEF OF DRAPER CITY
APPELLEES

vs.
THE CITY AND MUNICIPALITY OF
DRAPER, THE DRAPER CITY BOARD OF
ADJUSTMENT, THE DRAPER CITY
PLANNING COMMITTEE, THE DRAPER
CITY COUNCIL, CHARLES L.
HOFFMAN, Mayor of Draper, ROBERT
BROWN, and KIM STEVENS,

Case No. 960833-CA

Defendants/Appellees.

APPEAL FROM A DECISION OF THE
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY,
JUDGES LEONARD H. RUSSON AND ANNE M. STIRBA

Oral Argument Priority Classification No. 15

Reid W. Lambert
Nicholas E. Hales
WOODBURY & KESLER, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff/
Appellant Sanders
265 East 100 South, #300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 364-1100

Jody K Burnett
WILLIAMS & HUNT
Attorneys for Draper City
Defendants/Appellees
257 East 200 South, Suite 500
P. O. Box 45678
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-5678
Telephone: (801) 521-5678

Bruce A. Maak, Of Counsel
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN
& GEE
Attorney for Defendants/
Appellees Robert E. and Diane Brown
185 South State Street, #1300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone (801) 532-7840

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

1

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS . . . .

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS

3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

4

ARGUMENT

6

POINT I

6

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED THE CLAIMS
AGAINST THE CITY BECAUSE IT OWED NO DUTY TO
SANDERS
A.
THE PUBLIC DUTY DOCTRINE HAS BEEN OFTEN AND
RECENTLY AFFIRMED BY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
AS APPLICABLE IN UTAH TO CLAIMS AGAINST
MUNICIPALITIES. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY
APPLIED THE DOCTRINE TO SANDERS' CLAIMS . . .
B.

THE CITY OWED SANDERS NO SPECIFIC DUTY
INDEPENDENT OF THAT OWED TO THE GENERAL
PUBLIC

POINT II

6

7

12
14

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT SANDERS' CLAIMS ARE
BARRED BY THE RUNNING OF APPLICABLE STATUTES OF
LIMITATIONS
14
POINT III

16

SANDERS' CLAIMS AGAINST THE CITY ARE BARRED BY THE
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT
CONCLUSION

16
17

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Beach v. Univ. of Utah, 726 P.2d 413 (Utah 1986)

8

Cache County v. Property Tax Div., 922 P.2d 758, 767
(Utah 1996)

12

Cannon v. Univ. of Utah, 866 P.2d 586 (Utah App. 1993)

...

10

Crist v. Mapleton City, 497 P.2d 633, 634 (Utah 1972) . . . .

12

Debry v. Noble, 889 P. 2d 428, 444 (Utah 1995)

16

DeVilliers v. Utah County, 882 P.2d 1161 (Utah App. 1994) . .

10

Ferree v. State, 784 P. 2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989)
Gillman
(Utah
Higgins
(Utah

7, 8

v. Dep't of Financial Inst., 782 P.2d 506, 512
1989)
16
v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231
1993)
9, 11, 13, 14

Lamarr v. Utah State Dep't of Transp., 828 P.2d 535
(Utah App. 1992)

10

Madsen v. Borthick, 850 P.2d 442 (Utah 1993)

8, 9, 13

Nelson By and Through Stuckman v. Salt Lake City,
919 P.2d 568, 572 (Utah 1996)

7, 10, 11

Obray v. Malmberg, 484 P.2d 160, 162 (Utah 1971)
Rollins v. Petersen, 813 P.2d 1156 (Utah 1991)

8, 16
. . . .

8, 10, 11

Statutes and Rules
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-15 (1953)

1, 14, 15

Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001

1

Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1002

1, 11, 12

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10

16

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j)

1

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4)

1

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (k)

1
ii

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over this
case under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j).

The Supreme Court is

authorized to transfer this appeal to the Court of Appeals under
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4).

The Court of Appeals has appellate

jurisdiction over this case pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(k).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Draper City appellees accept the statement of issues 1
and 2 addressing plaintiff/appellant's claims against Draper as
adequate for the purposes of this appeal.

Draper City adopts and

incorporates by this reference the standing issue identified by
the Brown appellees in their brief.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-15 (1953):
The city or any person aggrieved by any
decision of the board of adjustment may have
and maintain a plenary action for relief
therefrom in any court of competent
jurisdiction; provided, petition for such
relief is presented to the court within
thirty days after filing of such decision in
the office of the board.
Note:

Sanders cites and relies upon provisions of Utah Code Ann.

§ 10-9-1001 and 1002 for his statute of limitation and private
cause of action arguments.

These statutes were enacted by the

Legislature in 1991; whereas, the events giving rise to this
action occurred in the 1980s and Sanders filed his complaint in
April of 1990.

Therefore, the provisions of §§ 10-9-1001 and

1002 are inapplicable to this appeal.
1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Despite the length of time required to dispose of this case
at the trial court level, the case was and is relatively simple
as it applies to the claims against Draper City, both factually
and legally.

In 1978, just after Draper had incorporated as a

city, the Draper City Planning Commission denied an application
for subdivision of a five acre lot into smaller parcels.

In 1979

the City Board of Adjustment approved a variance on the same
property which, after the addition of one adjoining acre of
property, was approved for creation of three parcels or lots
conditioned upon completion of some improvements.

Sanders

complains of this 1979 action and argues that it is void.
Also in 1979 the owner of one of the three lots created by
the variance sold half of the lot to another, thereby creating an
additional parcel.

In 1988 the City granted a variance on the

additional parcel, subject to certain conditions.
In April of 1990 Sanders commenced this action against the
City and Municipality of Draper, the Draper City Board of
Adjustment, the Draper City Planning Committee, the Draper City
Council, and Charles L. Hoffman, Mayor of the City of Draper
(collectively referred to herein as the "City") and against
Robert Brown, Kim Stevens and John Does I through X.

Sanders'

claims against the City are essentially that(l) its 1979 variance
was void; (2) the 1988 variance was improper; and (3) it has
allegedly failed to enforce the conditions attached to the 1979
and 1988 variances.
2

In June of 1990 the Draper defendants filed with the trial
court a motion to dismiss on the grounds that (1) they owed
Sanders no duty on which he could base his claims, (2) the claims
were barred by the governmental immunity statute, and (3) the
claims were barred by running of applicable statutes of
limitations.

The trial court (Russon, J.) granted the motion and

entered an order of dismissal of the Draper defendants on
November 26, 1990.
Sanders subsequently proceeded with his claims against Kim
Stevens and Robert Brown, for which judgment was eventually
entered against him.

He has now appealed to this Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

For purposes of review of the trial court's grant of the
City's motion to dismiss, the facts are those contained in the
Complaint, to be taken as true. Not all of the alleged facts,
however, are material to the issues of duty and running of the
statute of limitations, the grounds for which the dismissal was
entered.

Nor is this Court, as stated by Sanders (Appellant's

Brief, p. 3 n. 1), required to accept as true those legal
conclusions which are alleged in the Complaint.-'

To the extent

necessary for an understanding of the legal and factual issues
involved in reviewing the claims against the Draper City

- Allegations that the 1979 variance approval was illegal or that the
property had been illegally subdivided are examples of such legal conclusions.
However, because these conclusions are immaterial to the trial court's
dismissal of the claims against the City, they are not discussed herein and
should not color this Court's view of the relevant facts.

3

appellees, the statement of facts of the Brown appellees is
adopted and incorporated herein by this reference.
1.

In 1978 the Draper City Planning Commission denied an

application to subdivide a five acre piece of property, part of
which is the subject of this action.
2.

(R. 279-80).

In 1979 the Draper City Board of Adjustment approved a

variance, subject to conditions, permitting the division of the
five acre parcel and an adjoining one acre parcel into three
lots.

(R. 281-83, 580).
3.

At all times relevant to Sanders' claims against Draper

City, there was no mechanism to notify cities that property
within their limits had been sold.

Nor were there any statutes,

ordinances or other requirements which would impose an
affirmative duty on a city, or grant it power, to examine titles
and conveyances of properties to determine whether subdivision
violations were occurring, to prevent sale of noncomplying
property or to void sales of property.
4.

On July 20, 1988, the Draper City Board of Adjustment

granted to Mountainwest and Ovard a variance, subject to
conditions, on the front parcel.
5.

(R. 1554).

Sanders commenced this action by filing a Complaint

dated April 23, 1990.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The private duty doctrine is well established in Utah law
and provides that a tort claim may not be pursued against a
governmental entity based upon a duty owed by the government to
4

the general public.

Rather, the plaintiff must identify a

recognized duty specifically owed to him rather than to the
public at large.

Sanders has failed to identify, either here or

at the trial court level, any such duties which do not clearly
fall within the public duty doctrine.
Sanders' argument that the public duty doctrine should be
abandoned in Utah is weak and finds no support in recent Utah
case law.

In 1991 the Utah Supreme Court decided in a 4-1

decision not to do away with the public duty doctrine and in two
1993 cases applied the public duty doctrine to claims against
governmental entities.
doctrine in 1996.

It continued to recognize the public duty

Likewise, the Utah Court of Appeals has

consistently and recently applied the public duty doctrine, most
recently in 1994.
The trial court properly applied this well established
doctrine when it decided that Sanders had identified no duty owed
by the City to him as an individual as distinguished from a duty
owed to the general public.

The trial court's conclusion should

be affirmed by this Court.
Aside from the fact that the City owed Sanders no duty,
resulting in the failure of his tort claims, Sanders also failed
to bring his action against the City within the statutory
limitation periods.

He initiated no judicial appeal of the board

of adjustment decisions within the thirty day period, as provided
by statute.

Nor did he assert his more general claims until

nearly eight years after they had accrued.
5

Clearly, he has

failed to take action within the statutory limitation periods and
his claims are barred•
In addition, Sanders' claims against the City are barred by
the express provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act.

The

acts of granting permits and conducting investigations are
clearly discretionary and are expressly immune from civil action.
The trial court properly applied the law to each of these
claims.

There is no basis in the record for a finding that the

court improperly interpreted any of the legal issues involved.
The judgment of the trial court should, therefore, be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED THE CLAIMS
AGAINST THE CITY BECAUSE IT OWED NO DUTY TO
SANDERS.
It is difficult to determine from Sanders' complaint and
from his Appellant's Brief the exact nature of the duty which he
believes the City owed him.-7

After urging the abandonment of

the public duty doctrine, he alternatively argues that exceptions
to the doctrine apply to him.

However, he fails to allege or

argue facts which would reasonably lead to the conclusion that he
falls within one of the alleged exceptions.

Nor does he identify

a specific duty which the City owed to him as an individual.
Rather, he argues that he should be permitted to pursue his
claims against the city for "its failure to discharge its

The Draper City appellees adopt and incorporate by this reference
the argument that Sanders lacks standing to assert any claim in this action as
set forth in the brief of the Brown appellees.

6

statutory duty to enforce the law."

He fails to specify what

specific actions the city would be required to take, how those
actions arise from a recognized legal duty and how such a duty
would be owed to him as an individual rather than to the public
at large.
A.

THE PUBLIC DUTY DOCTRINE HAS BEEN OFTEN AND RECENTLY
AFFIRMED BY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT AS APPLICABLE IN UTAH TO
CLAIMS AGAINST MUNICIPALITIES. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY
APPLIED THE DOCTRINE TO SANDERS' CLAIMS.
Sanders relies on foreign case law for his argument that the

public duty doctrine should be abandoned in Utah and in support
of his assertions of various exceptions to application of the
doctrine.

This examination of the law of other states is,

however, unnecessary.

Utah has extensive and recent case law

which deals with the public duty doctrine and clearly establishes
the nature and scope of the law of this state under that
doctrine.
To make a prima facie case of negligence, Sanders must first
establish a duty of care owed by the City to him.
v. State. 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989).

E.g.,

Ferree

Where there is no duty,

there can be no negligence as a matter of law.

Nelson By and

Through Stuckman v. Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 568, 572 (Utah
1996) .

The public duty doctrine defines the parameters of a duty

owed by a governmental entity which is sufficient to form the
basis for a negligence action:
For a governmental agency and its agents to be
liable for negligently caused injury suffered by a
member of the public, the plaintiff must show a
breach of a duty owed him as an individual, not
merely the breach of an obligation owed to the
7

general public at large by the governmental
official.
Ferree at 151, citing Obray v. Malmbercr. 484 P.2d 160, 162 (Utah
1971).

See also

Beach v. Univ. of Utah. 726 P.2d 413 (Utah 1986)

(rules and regulations of the government-owned university were
insufficient to establish a duty to a particular student as
opposed to a duty to the university population at large).
Since Ferree and Beach, this Court and the Utah Supreme
Court have had several opportunities to evaluate the
applicability of the public policy doctrine.

For example, in

Rollins v. Petersen. 813 P.2d 1156 (Utah 1991), the Supreme Court
identified the pragmatic nature of the analysis under the public
duty doctrine and discussed when special relationships would
establish a specific duty to an individual aside from any duty to
the general public.

The Rollins court identified the analysis as

a pragmatic one in which the need to protect a particular
plaintiff is weighed against the needs of the general public for
the governmental entity to effectively do its job.
1160-61.

Rollins

Citing Ferree. the Rollins court noted that conversion

of a general public duty to a specific duty owed to an individual
would impose too broad a duty on public entities which would
interfere with their abilities to perform their jobs.

Rollins at

1160.
In Madsen v. Borthick. 850 P.2d 442 (Utah 1993), the Supreme
Court again affirmed the trial court's application of the public
duty doctrine to find no duty owed to the plaintiffs.

The Madsen

court held that statutory provisions did not create a duty owed
8

to the plaintiffs absent clear evidence of a special relationship
and do not imply a duty beyond that imposed by the express
language of the statute.

Madsen at 446-47.

Also in 1993 the Supreme Court discussed the public policy
surrounding the doctrine in Hiaains v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d
231 (Utah 1993).

The Hiaains court acknowledged that there may

be circumstances in which a governmental entity may owe a duty to
a specific individual apart from that owed to the public at
large.

It noted that the approach to determining whether a

special relationship exists sufficient to impose a duty is a
policy-based one.

Hiaains at 236.

Determining whether the actor has a duty to
prevent another's harm requires careful
consideration of the consequences of imposing that
duty for the parties and for society. We are
loath to recognize a duty that is realistically
incapable of performance or fundamentally at odds
with the nature of the parties' relationship.
Accordingly, in determining the existence of a
duty, we examine such factors as the identity and
character of the actor, the victim, and the
victimizer, the relationship of the actor to the
victim and the victimizer, and the practical
impact that finding a special relationship would
have.
Hiaains at 237 (citations omitted).
The Hiaains court also noted that its "pragmatic, policybased analysis" generally has led to the conclusion that
if the broad claim for a special relationship and
the consequent duty was accepted, the defendant in
question would be unable to perform the duty
without either radically changing its character or
drastically circumscribing the function it was
charged with performing.

9

Higgins at 237.

While the Higgins court recognized that it may

be appropriate to find a duty toward individuals or narrow
classes of individuals, it "rejected the claims for broad
categories of special relationships which operatively seem to be
indistinguishable from a general negligence theory,"

Id.

In 1996 the Supreme Court once again acknowledged the
viability of the public duty doctrine, though holding that the
municipality had assumed an independent duty toward the
plaintiff.

Nelson 919 P.2d 568.

This Court has also recently discussed and applied the
public duty doctrine.

Lamarr v. Utah State Dep't of Transp., 828

P.2d 53 5 (Utah App. 1992) (under public duty doctrine, city owed
no duty to pedestrian to control transients); Cannon v. Univ. of
Utah, 866 P.2d 586 (Utah App. 1993) (public duty doctrine barred
claims and University owed no special duty to plaintiffs);
DeVilliers v. Utah County, 882 P.2d 1161 (Utah App. 1994) (county
owed no duty to plaintiffs to install warning signs on county
road).
Sanders argues that the public duty doctrine should be
abolished in Utah.

The cases he cites are all foreign cases

older than the recent Utah cases addressing and applying the
doctrine.

Also, Rollins clearly rejects this argument.

In

Rollins, Justice Durham, in her concurring and dissenting
opinion, while acknowledging that the public duty doctrine "is
probably still followed in a majority of states," Rollins at
1165, suggests that the court should "reconsider the continued
10

application of the public duty doctrine."

Rollins at 1166. That

position, however, was rejected by the 4-1 majority of the court.
The public duty doctrine is alive and well in Utah and the
trial court properly applied the doctrine in its ruling on the
City's motion to dismiss.
Sanders argues that there are recognized exceptions to the
public duty doctrine.

This is, however, not technically correct.

As part of the public duty doctrine, a plaintiff may only
maintain a negligence action if he can demonstrate a duty,
independent from that owed to the public at large, on which to
base the negligence claims.

In Nelson, for example, the court

held that the city had, by performing a function which it was not
required to perform, independently created a tort duty to the
plaintiff.

Other cases require the existence of a special

relationship which is sufficient to defeat the policy interest in
applying the public duty doctrine.

In other words, the issue is

not whether Sanders can demonstrate that he falls within an
"exception" to the public duty doctrine, but whether he can
demonstrate a recognized duty owed to him independently of the
duty owed to the general public, i.e., that the duty flowed to
him as an individual "distinguishable from the mass."

Hiaains at

237.
Sanders also argues that the legislature, in enacting Utah
Code Ann. § 10-9-1002, created a private remedy for individuals
against government entities which precludes application of the
public duty doctrine.

While a creative argument, it has two
11

flaws, one of which is fatal.
for this argument.

First, Sanders cites no authority

Second, and more importantly, § 10-9-1002 did

not take effect until more than a year after Sanders initiated
this action and nearly a year after the court entered its order
for dismissal.

A legislative enactment which affects vested

rights cannot be applied retroactively unless there is a clear
legislative expression of intent to do so.

Cache County v.

Property Tax Div., 922 P.2d 758, 767 (Utah 1996).

There is no

expression of legislative intent to make § 10-0-1002 retroactive.
It is, therefore, irrelevant to the issue as decided by the trial
court and before this Court on appeal.-7
B.

THE CITY OWED SANDERS NO SPECIFIC DUTY INDEPENDENT OF THAT
OWED TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC,
The duty imposed on the City by state statutes and City

ordinances is a duty owed to the general public.

The "statutory

duty to enforce the law"-' is a duty owed the general public and
not to Sanders independently from the public at large.

Whether

Sanders, as an individual, was arguably injured by a breach of
this general duty has nothing to do with the threshold issue of
whether the duty was one owed to him, as an individual, or to the
general public.

- Aside from the fact that § 10-9-1002 doesn't apply, the Utah Supreme
Court has rejected the argument that characterizing a claim as one for
mandamus is sufficient to avoid compliance with statutory requirements for
appeal. Crist v. Mapleton City, 497 P.2d 633, 634 (Utah 1972) ("A writ of
mandamus is not a substitute for and cannot be used in civil proceedings to
serve the purpose of appeal, certiorari, or writ of error.")
-;

Sanders' terms.

12

Despite Sanders' characterizations in his Appellate Brief,
the only claims of duty identified by him in his complaint are of
a general nature indicating statutory duties to the public at
large:
39. That since the time the City of Draper has
become aware of the conduct of Ovard which is
contrary to state law and City of Draper
ordinance, the City of Draper has ignored and
continues to ignore those circumstances and has
failed to enforce its laws and the laws of the
State of Utah or has attempted to enforce those
ordinances and laws in an ineffective manner.
40. That the City of Draper has a duty to police,
manage and regulate the development of real
property within its municipal borders and has
utterly failed, in this case, in that duty.-7
42. That, among other things, there is a duty on
the part of the City of Draper, by way of
enforcement of its ordinances and the laws of the
State of Utah to prosecute violations of those
laws and ordinances. ...
Complaint (R. 8)(emphasis added).

Nowhere in his complaint did

Sanders identify a duty which the City owed to him independent of
the duties he alleged which were owed to the general public.
Apparently attempting to fall within the Hiaains and Madsen
narrow class provisions, Sanders argued before the trial court
that (1) "there is an underlying intent to regulate the
development and growth of a municipality behind these statutes
which is designed to benefit all landowners in the city" and (2)
"The Plaintiffs herein are certainly members of that particular

-7 The City disagrees that, as a matter of law, it had a duty to police
and manage the development of property. For purposes of the motion to
dismiss, this allegation has been treated as true although it is an erroneous
conclusion of law.

13

class of persons which these ordinances were
benefit . . . "

(R. 62)

designed to

On its face, however, this is an

argument that Sanders' interests are identical to those of the
general public.

This certainly is not the "narrow class"

distinguishable "from the mass" contemplated in Higgins.
Accepting the factual allegations of the complaint as true,
the trial court properly applied the public duty doctrine and
properly held that Sanders demonstrated no independent duty owed
by the City to him.

As a result, the dismissal of the claims

against the City for lack of a duty was proper and should be
affirmed.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT SANDERS'
CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE RUNNING OF APPLICABLE
STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS.
Sanders' claims against the City are essentially of two
types: (1) two claims that board of adjustment decisions were
improper (the 1979 and 1988 variances) and (2) an "ongoing
failure to abide by the law."

Appellant's brief, p. 19.

Neither

claim has been made within the applicable statutory period.
Sanders' claims related to the granting of variances fall
within the express provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-15 (1953)
which was the statute applicable to these claims at the time the
causes of action arose.

That section expressly provides for a

thirty day period after the grant of the variances in which
Sanders had to commence judicial action.
The city or any person aggrieved by any
decision of the board of adjustment may have
14

and maintain a plenary action for relief
therefrom in any court of competent
jurisdiction; provided, petition for such
relief is presented to the court within
thirty days after filing of such decision in
the office of the board.
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-15 (emphasis added).
The statutory period had obviously long since run on the
1979 variance before Sanders acquired the property.

He did,

however, have the opportunity to take appropriate action if he
considered the 1988 variance to have been improper.

He did not

do so until nearly two years after the variance was granted, well
beyond the statutory thirty day period.

As a result, Sanders'

claims related to the board of adjustment grants of variances are
barred as a matter of law.
Clearly, by the end of 1982 Sanders was aware of the
problem, the injury and the alleged failure of the City.

At that

time, the last event necessary to assert the claims which Sanders
makes against the City had occurred.

In other words, the cause

of action had accrued and the limitation period began to run.
Sanders did not commence his action against the City until
nearly eight years after it had accrued, well beyond the
statutory periods.

Nor did he commence his claims arising from

the board of adjustment actions within the statutorily required
thirty day period.

As a result, the trial court correctly ruled

that his claims against the City were barred by the running of
the applicable statutes of limitation.
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POINT III
SANDERS' CLAIMS AGAINST THE CITY ARE BARRED
BY THE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT.
Though the trial court did not base its motion to dismiss on
the governmental immunity act, this issue was presented by the
City in its memorandum discussion.

R. 52-53).

Because this

issue was preserved before the trial court, it is appropriate for
this Court to consider the issue.

See Debry v. Noble, 889 P.2d

428, 444 (Utah 1995) ("It is well-settled that an appellate court
may affirm a trial court's ruling on any proper grounds, even
though the trial court relied on some other ground.")
The types of claims asserted by Sanders fall within the
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 (1953, as amended 1989),
the statutes applicable at the time suit was initiated.

Section

63-30-10(1)(a) provides immunity for discretionary functions.
Investigation and prosecution of alleged ordinance violations are
discretionary functions which are immune.

Obray at 162.

Section

63-30-10(1)(c) establishes immunity for alleged negligence in
"the issuance, denial, suspension or revocation of or the failure
or refusal to issue, deny, suspend or revoke any permit, license,
certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization."

Claims

based on these activities are barred because these activities
"are essential governmental functions that must be free from tort
liability."

Gillman v. Dep't of Financial Inst.. 782 P.2d 506,

512 (Utah 1989).

Section 63-30-10(1)(d) provides immunity for

failing to inspect property or by reason of making an inadequate
or negligent inspection of property.
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Sanders' claims of failure to investigate and prosecute,
improperly granting or revoking variances, and failing to
"properly police the development and subdivision" of property all
fall within the scope of these areas of immunity.

As a result,

they are barred by the governmental immunity act.
CONCLUSION
The public duty doctrine clearly applies in Utah to tort
claims against governmental entities to preclude liability to
individuals based upon duties owed to the general public.
Sanders has failed to state any duty owed to him independent of
that owed to the general public and has, therefore, failed to
state a duty on which his action can be based.
In addition, Sanders' claims are barred by the running of
the appropriate statutes of limitation and by the governmental
immunity act.
As a result, the holdings of the trial court are correct as
a matter of law and should be affirmed.
DATED this

«•>»

day of March, 1997.
WILLIAMS & HUNT
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